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REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF PUBLIC
INTEREST IN PROTECTING THE PUBLIC
HEALTH—THE NECESSITY FOR DENYING
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN MEDICALLY-RELATED
PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES AFTER EBAY V.
MERCEXCHANGE
Lance Wyatt*

INTRODUCTION
The public’s interest in medicine and good health is substantial. However,
this interest is harmed when important medical devices or pharmaceuticals,
although infringing on valid patents, are suddenly taken off the market after a
court grants a permanent injunction. While permanent injunctions were
automatically granted by the Federal Circuit before the Supreme Court’s holding
in eBay v. MercExchange, courts now have more discretion to deny injunctive
relief. Now that courts have this newfound discretion after eBay, the public
should no longer expect to be harmed by the sudden removal of medical
supplies from the marketplace. Unfortunately, this has not been the course that
all courts have taken post-eBay. To protect the public interest, courts should
apply a rebuttable presumption in medically-related patent cases, finding that the
public interest weighs against granting an injunction.
This Comment highlights the necessity for this rebuttable presumption to
help protect the public health. Part I provides a brief overview of the history of
injunctive relief in patent infringement cases prior to 2006 and the few
exceptions applied to deny injunctions. Part II analyzes the eBay v.
MercExchange case, from its beginning in the district court to its remand back to
the district court after the landmark decision in the Supreme Court. Next, Part III
provides an overview of general trends regarding injunctive relief in patent
infringement cases post-eBay and also analyzes the courts’ treatment of
injunctive relief in recent cases in the medical patent space. Finally, in Part IV
expresses the importance of the public interest in medicine and the public health
and lays out the multiple reasons why it is necessary that the courts to apply a
rebuttable presumption of public interest to deny injunctive relief in patent cases
involving medically-related patents. Lastly, a set of hypothetical situations is
offered to emphasize the necessity of the rebuttable presumption.
*
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I. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES PRIOR TO 2006
A. Injunctive Relief Overview
The United States Constitution provides Congress with the enumerated
power “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to . . . inventors the exclusive right to their respective . . .
discoveries.”1 Pursuant to this power, the Patent Act of 1952, as amended,
governs patent law in the United States.2 A patent grants its holder the “right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States” for a certain amount of time.3 When this right to
exclude is infringed upon, courts “may grant injunctions in accordance with the
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on
such terms as the court deems reasonable.”4 Courts have traditionally established
that a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test
before being granted such relief.5 These factors include:
(1) that [the plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate
for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.6

However, not all courts have followed this four-factor test.
B. Federal Circuit’s “General Rule”
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, established in 1982 and given
exclusive patent appellate jurisdiction,7 did not follow this traditional four-factor
test prior to 2006.8 Instead, the Federal Circuit followed a “general rule that an
injunction will issue when infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound
reason for denying it.”9 This “automatic injunction rule,” or “general rule,” arose
1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see Sue Ann Mota, eBay v. MercExchange: Traditional
Four-Factor Test for Injunctive Relief Applies to Patent Cases, According to the Supreme
Court, 40 AKRON L. REV. 529, 530–33 (2007) (for a brief overview of patent law).
3
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). Currently, the term of a utility patent is twenty years
from the date that the patent application is filed. Id. § 154(a)(2).
4
35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).
5
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
6
Id.
7
Robin M. Davis, Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls: Permanent
Injunctions in Patent Infringement Cases Under the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005
and eBay v. MercExchange, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 435 (2008).
8
eBay, 547 U.S. at 391–94.
9
Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
2
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because the Federal Circuit would automatically apply a presumption of
irreparable harm to patentees upon a finding of infringement.10 This presumption
of irreparable harm was justified based upon the right to exclude granted by
patents.11 Thus, successful plaintiffs were granted injunctions as a matter of
course for over three decades.12
C. Public Health Exception
While most successful patentees received permanent injunctions under
the general rule, there was an exception to this rule.13 Prior to 2006, courts
would deny an injunction “in order to protect the public interest.”14 For example,
in City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., the Seventh Circuit denied
permanent injunctive relief to protect the public health.15 While the defendant
had infringed on the plaintiff’s patented sewage treatment process, the court
found that enforcing a permanent injunction would have closed the only sewage
plant in the entire community.16 An injunction would have left the community
without means to dispose of raw sewage other than running it into Lake
Michigan and polluting the waters.17 Furthermore, such an order would have
posed environmental and health risks to over half a million residents.18 The court
concluded that:
It is suggested that such harmful effect could be counteracted by chemical
treatment of the sewage, but where, as here, the health and the lives of
more than half a million people are involved, we think no risk should be
taken, and we feel impelled to deny appellee’s contention in this respect.19

Courts have also used the public interest exception to protect the public
health when certain medically-related patents were involved.20 For example, in
Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, the defendant
had infringed a patented process that produced vitamin D.21 This process
10

Davis, supra note 7, at 435–36.
See MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
vacated sub nom. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
12
Davis, supra note 7, at 436.
13
Id.
14
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547–48 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
15
69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
See Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (C.D. Cal. 1987),
aff’d, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Datascope Corp. v. Kontron, Inc., 611 F. Supp.
889 (D. Mass. 1985), aff’d, 786 F.2d 398 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Vitamin Technologists v. Wis.
Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1944).
21
Vitamin Technologists, 146 F.2d at 942.
11
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contributed to the cure or amelioration of the disease, rickets.22 Even though
these patents were found to be invalid, leaving the patentee without remedy, the
court noted the public health implications of an injunction in dicta.23 While the
patented process at issue could have been used to help cure rickets, a disease
affecting the poor, the patentee withheld the practice of the patented process for
this purpose.24 The court noted “it is a public offense to withhold such processes
from any of the principal foods of the rachitic poor”25 and concluded that such
refusal warranted the denial of a permanent injunction.26
Further, in Datascope Corp. v. Kontron, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant had infringed its patented dual lumen heart catheter (IAB)27 and
sought preliminary injunctive relief.28 Although preliminary injunctions and
permanent injunctions differ in scope, the same traditional four factors are
analyzed.29 The defendant made a showing that it would be irreparably harmed
by a preliminary injunction because it would suffer losses in sales, be forced to
lay off employees, its good will would be injured, and it would have to write off
inventory and capital improvements.30 More importantly, the defendant made a
showing that the public interest would be harmed by a preliminary injunction
because the record showed that “some physicians prefer defendant’s dual lumen
IABs.”31 Ultimately, the court denied the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief
with respect to the defendant’s dual lumen IABs.32
Additionally, some courts have modified permanent injunctions in
medically-related patent infringement cases to allow for transition periods to
accommodate the public interest.33 In Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Labs., Inc.,
injunctive relief was granted against the defendant for the plaintiff’s patented
22

Id.
Id. at 944–47.
24
Id. at 944.
25
Id. at 945.
26
Id. at 956.
27
Datascope Corp. v. Kontron, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 889, 894 (D. Mass. 1985), aff’d,
786 F.2d 398 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
28
Id. at 891.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 894.
31
Id.
32
Id.; see Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1015 (C.D. Cal.
1987), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (denying preliminary injunction for
infringed cancer and hepatitis test kits due to public health interests); see also Cordis
Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. CIV.A.03-027-SLR, 2003 WL 22843072, at *2 (D.
Del. Nov. 21, 2003), aff’d, 99 F. App’x 928 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying preliminary
injunction for infringed drug-eluting stents due to public health risks posed by inadequate
supply).
33
See Schneider (Europe) AG v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 813 (D. Minn.
1994); Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 964 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
23
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bubble blood oxygenator.34 However, due to concerns of potential short-term
supply problems from the sudden impact of the injunction, the court ordered that
the injunction “contain a six-month transition period to allow an efficient and
non-disruptive changeover for those institutions who now employ the
[infringing device] exclusively.” 35
While the public interest exception was used to deny some medicallyrelated patent injunctions, most injunctions were still granted.36 The Federal
Circuit’s “general rule” was abrogated, however, upon the Supreme Court’s
holding in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange.37

II. EBAY INC. V. MERCEXCHANGE, L.L.C.
A. The District Court
On May 27, 2003, following a five-week trial, a jury sitting in the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia returned a verdict finding that the
defendants, eBay Inc. and Half.com (a subsidiary of eBay Inc.), had infringed on
valid patents covering methods for conducting online auctions belonging to the
plaintiff, MercExchange, L.L.C.38 Following the jury trial, MercExchange filed a
motion for entry of a permanent injunction order.39 The court’s analysis began
by summarizing the precedent set by the Federal Circuit’s general rule,
automatically granting permanent injunctions after a finding of validity and
infringement, but it also reviewed the traditional four factors.40

34

Shiley, 601 F. Supp. at 971.
Id.; see Schneider, 852 F. Supp. at 861–62 (employing a six-month transition
period within permanent injunction of infringing medical catheter devices to “allow an
efficient and non-disruptive changeover for those institutions and physicians who now
employ the [infringing device] exclusively”).
36
See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(reversing denial of injunctive relief upon finding of infringement and remanding for
injunctive relief grant); Biacore v. Thermo Bioanalysis Corp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 422, 473–
74 (D. Del. 1999) (finding no sound reason to deny permanent injunctive relief for
infringed matrix coating suitable for use in a biosensor); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, 7
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1439, 1445 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (granting a permanent injunction while
holding that, although there is a public interest in the marketing of life saving medical
devices, such as the defendant’s infringing heart defibrillator, this interest is outweighed
by the greater public interest in “granting injunctions to effectuate patent rights”).
37
See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
38
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698–99 (E.D. Va. 2003),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated sub nom. eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
39
Id.
40
Id. at 711.
35
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The court then analyzed each equitable factor, beginning with irreparable
harm.41 The plaintiff argued for the presumption of irreparable harm established
by precedent and argued that it would be “deprived of its ability to either pursue
the development of its inventions under the protection of its patent rights, or to
have the exclusive right to license its patented technology to others on the most
beneficial terms available” if an injunction did not issue.42 However, the
defendant argued that the presumption of irreparable harm was rebuttable and
attempted to refute the presumption by highlighting certain behaviors of the
plaintiff43 including the plaintiff’s failure to practice the patent and an expressed
willingness to license the patent to the defendant. The court found that the
factors weighed against an injunction because the plaintiff would not be
irreparably harmed if a permanent injunction did not issue.44 Under the factor
pertaining to an adequate remedy at law, the court found that this factor weighed
against an injunction due to the plaintiff’s previous licensing of the patent to
others and their expressed willingness to license the patent to eBay. 45 Under the
public interest factor, the court found that, while there was a public interest in
enforcing valid patents, there was also a public interest in “using a patented
business-method that the patent holder declines to practice.”46 Therefore, the
court concluded that this factor equally supported both granting and denying an
injunction.47 Finally, under the balance of hardships factor, the court found that
this factor tipped slightly in the defendant’s favor because the plaintiff could be
adequately compensated monetarily and granting an injunction would open “a
Pandora’s box of new problems” for both parties.48 Ultimately, the court denied
the plaintiff’s motion for entry of a permanent injunction order,49 and the case
was appealed to the Federal Circuit.50
B. The Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of a permanent
injunction under an abuse of discretion standard.51 The court opined that the
public interest of using a business-method patent that the patent holder declines
to practice is not “the type of important public need that justifies the unusual
41

Id.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 712–13.
46
Id. at 712–14.
47
Id. at 714.
48
Id. at 714–15.
49
Id. at 715.
50
MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated
sub nom. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
51
Id. at 1338.
42
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step of denying injunctive relief.”52 Furthermore, the district court’s fear that an
injunction would open both parties to new problems was viewed to be an
inadequate reason for denying injunctive relief.53 Moreover, the fact that
MercExchange was willing to license the patent was an inadequate reason for
denying injunctive relief. The court reasoned that although an “injunction gives
the patentee additional leverage in licensing, that is a natural consequence of the
right to exclude and not an inappropriate reward to a party that does not intend
to compete in the marketplace with potential infringers.”54 The Federal Circuit,
seeing “no reason to depart from the general rule that courts will issue
permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional
circumstances,” granted the injunction.55 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
on November 28, 2005.56
C. The Supreme Court
The majority opinion for eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., written by
Justice Thomas, was rather short and solely dealt with determining the
appropriateness of the Federal Circuit’s general rule regarding permanent
injunctions.57 The Court abrogated the general rule and mandated that,
“[a]ccording to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a
permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant
such relief.”58 The Court established that a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.59

The Court stressed that “the creation of a right is distinct from the provision of
remedies for violations of that right.”60 Analyzing the district court’s suggestion
that injunctive relief could not issue “in a broad swath of cases,” especially
where a plaintiff is willing to license the patent or does not commercially
practice the patent, the Court held that “traditional equitable principles do not
permit such broad classifications.”61 The Court then determined that the Federal
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id. at 1339.
Id.
Id.
Id.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 546 U.S. 1029 (2005).
See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 389 (2006).
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 393.
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Circuit’s general rule created a categorical grant of injunctive relief in
opposition to the traditional rules of equity. 62 The majority opinion ultimately
vacated the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remanded for further
proceedings.63
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion that was joined by
Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg.64 While Chief Justice Roberts agreed with
the majority opinion’s holding that the decision to grant injunctive relief must
“be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity,” he highlighted the
historical treatment of injunctive relief in patent infringement cases, noting that
injunctive relief was granted in a vast majority of cases since the early
nineteenth century.65 The Roberts concurrence did reject the Federal Circuit
general rule but also noted that district courts should let history play a role in
determining whether injunctive relief should be issued rather than “writing on an
entirely clean slate.”66 He concluded by noting that “[w]hen it comes to
discerning and applying those standards, in this area as others, ‘a page of history
is worth a volume of logic.’”67 The Roberts concurrence arguably emphasized
that permanent injunctions should still be liberally granted.68
Justice Kennedy also wrote a concurring opinion that was joined by
Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer.69 While Justice Kennedy
concurs with the majority opinion’s holding and acknowledges Chief Justice
Robert’s emphasis on historical precedent, he pointed out three ways that the
patent industry has changed since the historical decisions were decided.70 First,
the Kennedy concurrence highlighted the increased use of patent holders that
“use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead,
primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”71 Justice Kennedy noted that injunctive
relief might not be a good remedy as these firms usually use their patents to
charge exorbitant licensing fees.72 Next, the opinion acknowledged that legal
remedies may suffice and denial of an injunction may be in the public interest
when the patent covers only a small component of a much larger commercial
product and “the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage
in negotiations.”73 Finally, the opinion concluded by analyzing the difference in
62

Id. at 394.
Id.
64
Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
65
Id. at 395.
66
Id.
67
Id. (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
68
George M. Newcombe et al., Prospective Relief for Patent Infringement in a PosteBay World, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 549, 555 (2008).
69
eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
70
Id. at 395–97.
71
Id. at 396.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 396–97.
63
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the nature of contemporary patents compared to historical patents.74 Justice
Kennedy stated that “injunctive relief may have different consequences for the
burgeoning number of patents over business methods, which were not of much
economic and legal significance in earlier times. The potential vagueness and
suspect validity of some of these patents may affect the calculus under the fourfactor test.”75
D. The District Court Remand
On remand, the district court reanalyzed the four-factor test for injunctive
relief pursuant to the preceding Supreme Court opinion.76 It is relevant to note
that subsequent to the jury verdict, MercExchange non-exclusively licensed its
patent portfolio to uBid, a direct competitor of eBay. 77 Additionally,
MercExchange and uBid had begun preliminary negotiations about exclusive
licensing shortly after the Supreme Court’s eBay opinion but were unable to
reach an agreement successfully.78 Before its analysis under the four-factor test,
the court determined whether a presumption of irreparable harm upon a finding
of validity and infringement still applied after the Supreme Court opinion.79
After reviewing relevant post-eBay cases, the court determined that a
presumption of irreparable harm no longer existed, but rather, the burden was on
the plaintiff to prove irreparable harm.80 However, the court was “not blind to
the reality that the nature of the right protected by a patent, the right to exclude,
will frequently result in a plaintiff successfully establishing irreparable harm in
the wake of establishing validity and infringement.”81
The court then applied the four-factor test to the facts of the case,
beginning with the irreparable harm factor.82 Determining that the plaintiff did
not establish irreparable harm, the court concluded that this factor weighed
against the entry of an injunction.83 Based on multiple factors, the court reached
74

Id. at 397.
Id.
76
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (E.D. Va. 2007).
77
Id. at 561.
78
Id. at 562.
79
Id. at 568–69.
80
Id.; see z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex.
2006) (concluding that the language in the Supreme Court’s eBay opinion “does not
imply a presumption, but places the burden of proving irreparable injury on the
plaintiff”); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04–CV–211–DF, 2006 WL
2385139, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug.16, 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 504 F.3d 1293
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The eBay decision demonstrates that no presumption of irreparable
harm should automatically follow from a finding of infringement.”).
81
MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 569.
82
Id.
83
Id.
75
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this conclusion by determining that “MercExchange ha[d] acted inconsistently
with defending its right to exclude and that it ha[d] failed to establish why its
harm [wa]s irreparable.”84 First, the court noted MercExchange’s lack of
commercial activity in practicing the relevant patents.85 The court prudentially
acknowledged that this factor, while not being dispositive against granting an
injunction, was “one factor that this court must consider in weighing the
equities.”86 Next, the court recognized MercExchange’s private and public
actions indicating its desire to obtain royalties from eBay.87 The relevant public
actions included MercExchange’s and its attorney’s multiple public expressions
regarding MercExchange’s willingness to license its patents to eBay.88 The
relevant private action included pre-trial licensing negotiations between
MercExchange and eBay.89 Additionally, the court acknowledged
MercExchange’s failure to motion for preliminary injunction.90 Like the noncommercial activity factor, the court recognized that this factor was also not
dispositive against granting an injunction and likened the failure to motion for
preliminary injunction to MercExchange’s desire to obtain reasonable royalties
from eBay. 91 Finally, the court raised the same concern in its previous analysis
regarding the nature of the relevant patents—the business method patent and “a
patent which appears to rely upon a unique combination of non-unique elements
present in prior art.”92 Additionally, the court was not persuaded by
MercExchange’s argument that irreparable harm was proved because eBay was
a market monopolist.93 To comply with the ruling in the Supreme Court’s eBay
opinion, the court emphasized that its determination was specific to the facts in
this case and “not broad classifications or categorical exclusions of certain types
of patent holders.”94
Next, the court analyzed the adequate remedy at law factor, concluding
that “damages at law constitute[d] an adequate remedy for eBay’s wilful
infringement.”95 The court recognized that the analysis for this factor greatly
overlapped the analysis for the first factor.96 The fact that MercExchange did not
commercially utilize its patent, its willingness to license to eBay, and its

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id. at 569–76.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 572–73.
Id. at 572.
Id.
Id. at 573.
Id.
Id. at 574–76.
Id. at 579–80.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 582.
Id.
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licensing activity with others in the industry convinced the court that money
damages through a royalty paid by eBay would suffice.97
Then, the court analyzed the third factor—the balance of hardships.98
Based upon the uncertainty of MercExchange’s negotiations with uBid,
uncertainty involving eBay’s ability to design around the relevant patents, and
uncertainty of the patents’ ability to survive reexamination.99 If eBay could have
designed around the patent, the court concluded that eBay would not have
suffered hardship if an injunction were granted.100 On the other hand, the court
concluded that MercExchange would not suffer hardship if an injunction was
denied due to royalties received from eBay or, in the alternative, did not suffer
hardship due to the failed negotiations with uBid.101
Finally, the court analyzed the fourth factor—the public interest.102
Considering “the type of patent involved, the impact on the market, the impact
on the patent system, and any other factor that may impact the public at large,”
the court concluded that the public interest factor weighed slightly in favor
against granting an injunction.103 Under the first factor, the type of patent
involved, the court acknowledged Justice Kennedy’s words of caution in his
eBay concurrence.104 Next, although the public health was not implicated in this
case and there is an interest in a strong patent system that protects patentees
from infringers, the court still felt that damages at law were in the best interest
of the public due to the difference in market size between eBay and
MercExchange and MercExchange’s intentions to neither defend its right to
exclude or prevent development of its patent by others.105 Again, the court
emphasized that its analysis was based upon the specific facts of the case and
did not create a general rule.106 Then, concluding that neither allegation was
given any weight to its analysis, the court reviewed the allegations by each party
of inequitable conduct by the opposing party.107 The court analyzed eBay’s
status as a wilful infringer in its public interest analysis and concluded that while
it was significant, it was insufficient to tip the analysis in MercExchange’s

97

Id. at 582–83.
Id. at 583–86.
99
Id. at 583–84.
100
Id. at 584.
101
Id. at 584–85.
102
Id. at 586.
103
Id.
104
Id.; see eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (noting that the “potential vagueness and suspect validity of some
[business method patents] may affect the calculus under the four-factor test”).
105
MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 586–88.
106
Id. at 588.
107
Id. at 588–90.
98
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favor.108 Ultimately, the court found the four-factor test in eBay’s favor and
denied MercExchange’s motion for permanent injunction.109

III. THE STATE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN MEDICALLY-RELATED
PATENT CASES SINCE EBAY
A. General Trends of Injunctive Relief Since eBay
After the Supreme Court handed down the eBay v. MercExchange
opinion, courts applied the four factors differently, but the results highlighted
some general trends regarding when injunctive relief would or would not be
granted.110 Commentators have performed informative studies that validate these
general trends.111 First, a study by Benjamin Petersen analyzed patent cases
granting or denying injunctive relief after the eBay decision up to February 3,
2008, finding that injunctive relief was granted in twenty-four cases and denied
in ten cases.112 Additionally, a study by Douglas Ellis, John Jarosz, Michael
Chapman, and L. Scott Oliver concluded that, out of thirty-six post-eBay patent
cases that analyzed motions for injunctive relief, such relief was granted four out
of five times.113 Finally, a study by Rachel M. Janutis found that injunctive relief
continued to be granted in most patent cases from February 2008 to October
2009.114
1. Direct Competition
One general trend these studies observed involved direct competition
between the parties.115 Courts were more likely to grant injunctive relief when
the parties were direct competitors in the same marketplace.116 The Petersen
study found that when direct competitors were involved, a denial of injunctive
relief occurred only twice. 117 Additionally, the Ellis study found that in all but
108
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two cases, “permanent injunctions issued in all twenty-six cases where courts
found direct competition.”118 Finally, in the Janutis study, it was determined that
injunctive relief was granted in seventeen cases where direct competition was
found, while only denied in four cases.119
The Petersen study did highlight a case, Commonwealth Scientific &
Industrial Research Org. v. Buffalo Technology, Inc., where the district court for
the Eastern District of Texas granted the patent holder injunctive relief despite
the parties’ lack of direct competition.120 The court pointed out the unique aspect
of the patent holder being a governmental research agency.121
2. Licensing the Invention
Another general trend was found regarding the patent holder’s licensing
of the patent.122 These studies found that courts were less likely to grant
injunctive relief when the patent holder licenses his invention to other parties.123
The Petersen study found that “[i]n five of the ten post-eBay cases denying
permanent injunctions, the patent holder licensed his invention to other parties,”
and the existence of a licensing program was nearly dispositive in courts’
decisions precluding injunctive relief.124
3. A Small Component of the Infringing Product
A third general trend was found when the patented product is but a small
component of a larger infringing device.125 This trend, indicating that injunctive
relief is not generally granted in such cases, appears to follow from Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in eBay, suggesting that injunctions might not be
appropriate in cases where the patented device is merely a small component of
the infringing device because “legal damages may well be sufficient to
compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public
interest.”126 The Petersen study indicated that injunctive relief was never granted
when the patented device was merely a small component.127
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4. Practicing the Invention
Finally, a general trend surrounding the patent holder’s practice of the
invention has been observed.128 Courts are more likely to grant injunctive relief
when the patent holder practices the invention; however, there is a strong
correlation between this trend and the direct competition trend.129 The Petersen
study acknowledged a case, Novozymes A/S v. Genencor International, Inc.,
where, although the court granted injunctive relief despite the fact that the patent
holder did not practice the invention, the patent holder had licensed the patent to
one of its subsidiaries.130 The Petersen study also pointed out that this factor was
secondary to the direct competition factor, finding the direct competition factor
dispositive where the two factors “yield different results.”131
B. Injunctive Relief in Medically-Related Patent Cases After eBay
While general trends surrounding the courts’ treatment of injunctive relief
have arisen, these trends are less apparent with regard to patent cases related to
medicine. This section analyzes the courts’ unpredictable treatment of injunctive
relief in medically-related patent cases—patent cases that cover device, method,
and pharmaceutical patents related to the treatment, management, or diagnostics
of medical illnesses.
Since eBay v. MercExchange, district courts and the Federal Circuit have
both granted and denied injunctive relief when medical patent infringement is
found.132 These courts have reached these holdings based on different arbitrary
conclusions under the traditional four-factor test.133 There have been many
arguments by petitioners and respondents alike that highlight the importance of
these cases.134
1. Cases Granting Injunctive Relief
a. Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.)
A couple of months after the eBay decision, the District Court for the
Western District of Tennessee decided a motion for permanent injunction in a
medical device case.135 The court found Synthes, a medical device manufacturer,
to have infringed a collection of patents belonging to Smith & Nephew, Inc., a
128
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competitor.136 The patents related to bone nails and the methods used in the
treatment of bone fractures.137 The court was tasked with determining whether
Smith & Nephew was entitled to injunctive relief based on the traditional fourfactor test. Both parties made the following arguments:
Synthes argues principally that (i) Smith & Nephew will not be irreparably
harmed because of the limited competition between the primary Smith &
Nephew product covered by the . . . patents and the infringing . . . nails,
(ii) Smith & Nephew has shown a willingness to be compensated fully for
its patents by money damages because in the past it has licensed the
patents to its competitors and has extended several licensing offers to
Synthes while this case has been pending, (iii) the overall balance of
hardships favors Synthes because Smith & Nephew’s business will not be
significantly affected by continued sales of the infringing products, and
(iv) the public health interest in having Synthes’ allegedly safer and more
effective TFN product available to treat femoral fractures is
substantial. . . . Smith & Nephew argues that (i) irreparable harm to the
sales of its patented femoral nails has been shown, together with the loss
of market momentum and the ability to form customer relationships, (ii)
money damages would not be adequate compensation, and (iii) the public
health interest would not be adversely affected by a permanent injunction
because substitute products and methods of treatment are available to the
public through Plaintiff and its selected licensees. Smith & Nephew argues
that it is substantially smaller than Synthes in the field of manufacturing
trauma products, and, therefore, that an injunction would give Smith &
Nephew the competitive support it needs to expand its customer base,
increasing market competition.138

Ultimately, the court granted the permanent injunction139 finding that
irreparable harm had been established due to Smith & Nephew’s loss of market
share, and resulting lost profits and loss of brand name recognition that were
both incalculable and irreparable.140 Additionally, the court found that remedies
available at law were inadequate and the balance of the hardships tipped in favor
of Smith & Nephew due to the continuing threat of patent infringement.141
Under the balance of the hardships analysis, the court held that the “[m]ere
hardship incurred in the process of ceasing operations . . . is not sufficient,” and
there were no considerable hardships imposed on physicians or patients due to
the ability of other competing product to fill any “temporary void created by the
injunction.”142 Finally, analyzing the public interests, the court gave great weight
136
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to the public interest in protecting the rights of patentees and did not find that
the public would be harmed by any “minor disruption to the distribution of the
infringing products.”143
b. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter International, Inc.
Baxter and Fresenius, both competitors in the hemodialysis device
market, went before the District Court for the Northern District of California in a
patent infringement suit.144 On a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the
court concluded that Fresenius had infringed Baxter’s patents related to a
hemodialysis machine, commonly used for kidney disease treatment.145 Baxter
then moved for permanent injunctive relief.146
The court analyzed the arguments set forth by both parties under the
traditional four-step test.147 The court found that the irreparable harm factor
weighed in Baxter’s favor due to the direct competitiveness between both
parties.148 Additionally, when analyzing the inadequacy of monetary damages,
the court held that “the loss of goodwill, reputation for innovation, [and] the
legal right to exclude, . . . are all forms of irreparable injury that cannot be easily
and readily quantified through a simple monetary award.”149 Moreover, due to
the evidence that Fresenius had offered at trial related to the “numerous, easilyimplemented alternatives” available, the court found that the balance of the
hardships tipped in Baxter’s favor.150 The court held that the balance of the
hardships favors the patentee when the infringer can sell non-infringing items.151
The court began its public interest analysis by noting many other courts that
have granted permanent injunctions in cases where alternative products were
available to the infringer.152 Finally, the court found that Fresenius’ concerns—
the annual demand for dialysis machines, the lack of proof that other suppliers
could meet the demand, the alleged inability to market the infringed product,
and the fact that other competing products did not have the same features as the
infringed product—could be addressed by Fresenius’ ability to design around
the infringing product and allowing a nine-month transition period to do so.153
143
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On appeal, Fresenius argued that the district court abused its discretion by
ignoring evidence introduced at trial.154 However, the Federal Circuit disagreed
finding that the district court had not abused its discretion because it had fully
analyzed each factor in the traditional four-factor test.155 The Federal Circuit did,
however, remand the case back to the district court to reconsider the injunction
in light of its reversal of the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of
law.156
c. B. Braun Melsungen AG v. Terumo Medical Corp.
After a 2010 jury trial, Terumo, a medical device manufacturer, was
found to have infringed patents belonging to Braun, a competitor.157 The patents
covered intravenous catheters used for the delivery of fluids under the skin.158
After trial, Braun motioned for a broad permanent injunction that would have
the effect of stopping all continuous sales of Terumo’s infringing product.159 In
response, Terumo argued for a narrower injunction that allowed for a “sunset”
period of fifteen months to continue selling in the alternative care market
(approximately 30% of the total market).160 The District Court for the District of
Delaware analyzed both proposals under the traditional four-factor test and
granted the narrower injunction proposed by Terumo.161 The court noted Braun’s
arguments for a broad injunction under the irreparable harm factor, including its
lack of licensing the patents to any competitors and the endangerment of its right
to exclude and good reputation without injunctive relief, but the court held that
this factor weighed in favor of Terumo’s narrower injunction because it would
not create any additional irreparable harm for Braun.162 Under the balance of the
hardships analysis, the court held that this factor weighed in favor of Terumo’s
proposed injunction because of the hardship that would be imposed on medical
professionals and the endangerment to Terumo’s reputation under Braun’s broad
injunction.163 Finally, under the public interest factor, the court held that this
factor also weighed in favor of Terumo’s proposed injunction.164 The primary
reasons for this holding included the effect on medical professionals under
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Braun’s proposed injunction and “the public interest in access to competing
alternatives to safe medical devices.”165
d. Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc.
After a five-day bench trial, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas concluded that Pozen, a pharmaceutical company, had infringed patents
held by its direct competitor, Par Pharmaceutical.166 The patents at issue related
to pharmaceutical formulations and methods for the treatment of migraine
headaches.167 Par motioned for permanent injunctive relief at the conclusion of
the bench trial, and the district court granted the injunction after a thorough
analysis under the traditional four-factor test.168 Pozen proved that it would
suffer irreparable harm without an injunction by producing evidence and arguing
that a lack of injunctive relief would result in a loss of “vital revenue,” an
irreversible loss of market share, and price erosion.169 Pozen also conclusively
proved that monetary relief was an inadequate remedy. 170 Further, the court
found that the balance of hardships tipped in Pozen’s favor.171 Finally, under the
public interest analysis, the court held that the public interest weighed in favor
of a permanent injunction because of the public’s interest in encouraging
innovation by upholding the patent holder’s right to exclude.172 Additionally, the
court held that the public would not be harmed by a permanent injunction
because of a large and readily-available supply of the patented product.173
165
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2. Cases Denying Injunctive Relief
a. Voda v. Cordis Corp.
Voda v. Cordis Corp. involved patents related to angioplasty guide
catheters.174 The plaintiff, Dr. Jan Voda, successfully established at trial that the
defendant, Cordis, had willfully infringed Dr. Voda’s patents.175 The District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma determined whether Dr. Voda was
entitled to injunctive relief under the four-factor test, and, using the factors
enunciated in the eBay case, the court decided that Dr. Voda was not entitled to
injunctive relief and denied the motion.176 The court made this determination
based on Dr. Voda’s failure to establish that he would be irreparably harmed
without injunctive relief and that monetary damages were inadequate.177 Dr.
Voda did, however, argue that irreparable harm could be established by a nonparty, but the court held that such harm was irrelevant in its analysis.178 While
Dr. Voda attempted to argue for a presumption of irreparable harm, the court
noted that no such presumption exists after the eBay decision.179 The court did
not analyze the balance of the hardships or the public interests involved.
On appeal, Dr. Voda argued that the district court erred in “adopting a
categorical rule that precludes a patent owner from proving its entitlement to an
injunction by showing irreparable harm to its exclusive licensee.”180 The Federal
Circuit, however, concluded that such ruling by the district court did not conflict
with eBay and that the district court had not erred or abused its discretion by
denying injunctive relief.181
b. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc.
In 2008, the District Court for the District of Delaware decided a motion
for permanent injunction after Medtronic was found to have infringed patents
permanent injunction of infringing naturally-occurring protein that stimulates the
production of red blood cells); Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., No. 04-CV-513-BR, 2007
WL 4180682, at *8 (D. Or. Nov. 20, 2007), aff’d, 551 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(granting and affirming a permanent injunction of orthopeodic nails used to treat bone
fractures); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Datascope Corp., 513 F. Supp. 2d 578, 586 (D. Md.
2007) (granting a permanent injunction of a method for fragmenting blood clots in
hemodialysis grafts).
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belonging to Advanced Cardiovascular Systems (ACS) and relating to blood
vessel stents.182 The court analyzed this motion under direction of the traditional
four-factor test and concluded that a permanent injunction should be denied.183
Under the irreparable harm factor, the court determined that ACS had failed to
establish irreparable harm because there was “no indication that Medtronic
[was] . . . drawing bare-metal stent sales away from ACS . . . [and] ACS [had]
not identified any specific customers it [had] lost, or [stood] to lose, directly as a
result of Medtronic’s continued sales of infringing stents.”184 Additionally, the
court determined that monetary damages were adequate based on ACS’s
previous licensing of the relevant patents.185
Of particular note was the court’s analysis of the public interest factor.
First, the court noted a strong public interest in maintaining diversity in the
coronary stent market based on precedential support.186 Second, the court noted
evidence contained in the record demonstrating physician preference for
Medtronic stents.187 For these reasons, the court concluded that the public
interest favored denial of a permanent injunction.188 Finally, because the other
factors weighed so heavily against granting injunctive relief, the court decided to
“not make extensive findings with respect to the balance of hardships.”189
c. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc.
Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. involved
an infringement of a patent related to a prosthetic vascular graft.190 W.L. Gore, a
medical device manufacturer, had infringed a patent belonging to Bard
Peripheral Vascular, a direct competitor.191 After the finding of infringement,
182
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Bard motioned for a permanent injunction, and the court analyzed the motion
under the four-factor test, primarily focusing on the adequacy of remedies at law
and public interest factors.192 Finding that both factors weighed heavily against
granting a permanent injunction, the court denied the motion.193 Under the
adequacy of remedies at law factor, the court determined that Bard could be
made whole through legal remedies, including an award of lost profits, a ten
percent reasonable royalty rate, and the imposition of a compulsory license on
the continued sales of the infringing products for the patent’s remaining life. 194
Under the public interest factor, the court analyzed arguments from both parties
and tried to predict the public health ramifications of granting a permanent
injunction.195 The court noted:
Given the utility of Gore’s infringing products . . . [and] the important role
that these products play in aiding vascular surgeons who perform life
saving medical treatments, sound public policy does not favor removing
Gore’s items from the market. The risk is too great. Placing Gore’s
infringing products out of reach of the surgeons who rely on them would
only work to deny many sick patients a full range of clinically effective
and potentially life saving treatments. The Court finds that the strength of
this factor alone precludes it from imposing a permanent injunction.196

Ultimately, the court denied the motion without analyzing the other factors.197
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a
permanent injunction holding that an “award of an ongoing royalty instead of a
permanent injunction to compensate for future infringement is appropriate in
some cases.”198
d. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. CIBA Vision Corp.
After a finding of infringement of its patents related to extended-wear
contact lenses, CIBA Vision Corp. motioned for a permanent injunction against
the infringer, Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc.199 While the court analyzed
the motion under the traditional four-factor test and denied the motion, this case
is notable for its detailed analysis regarding the public interest factor.200 Under
this factor, the court noted many ways the public would be harmed upon the
192
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grant of a permanent injunction.201 The court first noted the exorbitant costs that
would be placed on patients to have their contact lenses refitted when the
infringing lenses were no longer available on the market.202 The court speculated
that the total cost for this refitting would be close to $500 million.203 The court
also noted the “significant disruption, confusion and cost” that would occur
upon a permanent injunction and the hardship that would be placed on the
patients, including the time to be refitted, the risk to the patients’ health by
avoiding refitting, or the possibility of patients substituting lenses over the
internet without a valid prescription.204 Finally, the court highlighted the
possibility of patients who may not be able to be refitted at all and would be
forced to return to wearing glasses.205 While the consequences in this case are
not as grave as in the Bard case, the court noted that “nevertheless, this Court,
sitting in equity, finds [the] consequences to be sufficiently important and
adverse to millions of . . . patients that the public interest would be disserved if
an injunction were to be entered.”206
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for an infringing congestion medicine due to the patent holder’s failure to establish
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IV. REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF PUBLIC INTEREST IN MEDICAL
PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES
A. The Public Interest in Medicine
The public has always had a large interest in medicine.207 This heightened
interest in medicine exists due to its role in diagnosing and treating illnesses,
extending the term of life, and improving the overall health of the general
population.208 The United States patent system helps encourage innovation in
medical technologies that improve the health of the population by granting
exclusive rights to patent holders for limited terms.209 President Lincoln once
commented on the patent system, expressing that “the patent system added the
fuel of interest to the fire of genius.”210 While the patent system plays an
important role in protecting inventors and encouraging innovation, there have
been multiple times that the public interest in health has superseded this
system.211 After the demise of the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” to
automatically grant permanent injunctions in most infringement cases, courts
have been given more flexibility to protect the public interest in health by
denying permanent injunctions when medically-related patents are involved. 212
B. Reasons Why Permanent Injunctions Should Be Denied in Most MedicallyRelated Patent Infringement Cases
After eBay, courts were required to apply the traditional four-factor test
when deciding to grant injunctive relief.213 The fourth factor, the public interest,
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has sparingly been used in medically-related cases to deny injunctive relief. 214
Because the public has such a great interest in medicine, courts should apply a
rebuttable presumption, finding that the public interest weighs in favor of
denying injunctive relief in all cases that involve medically-related patents. If a
plaintiff cannot produce convincing evidence to rebut this presumption, courts
should deny injunctive relief, even when the other three factors weigh in favor
of granting a permanent injunction. This rebuttable presumption would not
contravene eBay because Justice Kennedy’s concurrence suggests that certain
patents might not be suited for injunctive relief.215 Furthermore, if injunctive
relief was denied in these cases, the plaintiff would not be left without remedy
but would be able to obtain remedies at law via monetary awards, reasonable
royalties, or compulsory licenses.216 Overall, this rebuttable presumption would
protect and promote the substantial public interest in the public health.217 Courts
should apply a rebuttable presumption that the public interest weighs in favor of
denying injunctive relief for the following reasons.
1. Judicial Uniformity
The most striking reason that courts should apply a rebuttable
presumption that the public interest weighs in favor of denying injunctive relief
in all cases that involve medically-related patents is judicial uniformity. Of the
cases described in Part IV, one glaring conclusion is apparent: courts apply the
traditional four factors unpredictably in these cases, even when devices are
relatively identical.218 Even when important devices that help sustain life are
involved (i.e., prosthetic heart valves, vascular stents, and hemodialysis
machines), courts unpredictably apply the factors, with some courts granting
injunctive relief despite public interest concerns and other courts denying
214
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injunctive relief due to public interest concerns.219 This lack of judicial
uniformity creates many problems. First, patients and health practitioners are
unable to predict when injunctions may occur and lack adequate time to prepare
for the transition resulting from injunctions. Also, legal practitioners are unable
to predict outcomes based on the facts related to their individual cases.
Furthermore, courts waste scarce judicial resources to determine injunctive relief
in each fact-intensive case, although no factual similarities among medicallyrelated patent cases can explain courts’ denial or grant of injunctive relief. If a
rebuttable presumption was applied in medically-related cases, patients and
health practitioners would no longer be blindsided by the sudden effect of a
permanent injunction, legal practitioners would be able to better predict judicial
outcomes based on the facts of their cases, and courts would no longer waste
judicial resources to determine injunctive relief for each medically-related patent
infringement case. Even if a rebuttable presumption in these cases was
considered to be too expansive, courts should attempt to create predictable
outcomes of injunctive relief based on specific factual differences. For example,
courts could establish categorical denial or grant of injunctive relief based on
certain factual trends (i.e., type of device or drug involved or medical condition
treated by the device or drug).
2. Physician Preference
Another reason that courts should apply a rebuttable presumption of
public interest is because of physician preference for the infringing device.
Doctors may prefer the infringing device for many reasons including superiority
of the infringing device, greater knowledge of the infringing device, or, simply,
greater ease of use of the infringing device. 220 While courts have commonly used
physician preference for support in denying preliminary injunctions, physician
preference has rarely been used in support of denying permanent injunctions.221
Physician preference is important because, if a permanent injunction is granted
and the physician can no longer use the preferred infringing device, there are
potential risks to the patient in continuing treatment. For example, in Advanced
Cardiovascular, physician preference was used as support in denying a
permanent injunction because declarations by four cardiologists each expressed
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“concern for the success of their surgeries should [the infringing] products be
removed from the market.”222
3. Interest in Medical Competition
A third reason supporting a rebuttable presumption of public interest is
the public interest in medical competition. This interest has been used by both
district courts and the Federal Circuit to deny injunctive relief in cases involving
coronary stents.223 Other courts have used this interest to support a denial of
injunctive relief or limiting injunctive relief.224 The theory behind this interest is
the need for patients to have alternative safe medical devices.225 Patients need to
have more alternatives in the medical device market in order to make informed
decisions about their treatment.226 When injunctions occur, patients are at risk of
having only one viable option on the market,227 and, even worse, patients may
have no viable alternatives after a permanent injunction due to supply issues
with the patented product.
4. Supply of the Patented Product
Another reason supporting a rebuttable presumption of public interest is
the risk of the patent holder being unable to meet patient demand once the
infringing product is taken off the market. While some courts have noted this
concern, it has found little use in supporting a denial of injunctive relief.228 Even
222
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See id.; see also Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 99 F. App’x 928, 935
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A] strong public interest supports a broad choice of drug-eluting
stents, even though no published study proves the superiority of either . . . stent.”); Cordis
Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., Nos. Civ.A. 03-027-SLR, Civ.A. 03-283-SLR, 2003
WL 22843072, at *2 (D. Del. Nov. 21, 2003) (noting the “obvious concern of depriving
the public of the best and safest medical devices by limiting competition”).
224
See B. Braun Melsungen AG v. Terumo Med. Corp., 778 F. Supp. 2d 506, 526 (D.
Del. 2011); Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., No. CV-030597-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL 920300, at *4–10 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2009), aff’d, 670 F.3d
1171 (Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated in part on reconsideration, 682 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir.
2012), and vacated in part on reh’g en banc, 476 F. App’x 747 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
225
B. Braun, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
226
See Conceptus, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., No. C 09-02280 WHA, 2012 WL 44064, at
*1–4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2012) (denying a permanent injunction of an infringing
contraceptive because the four factors weighed in favor of a denial and, primarily, the
public had an interest in “having a choice of products”).
227
See id.
228
Compare Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 789, 799, 825 (E.D. Tex.
2011) (noting supply concerns yet granting injunctive relief), with Cordis Corp. v. Boston
Scientific Corp., No. Civ.A. 03-027-SLR, 2003 WL 22843072, at *2 (D. Del. Nov. 21,
2003), aff’d, 99 F. App’x 928 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying preliminary injunction for
infringed drug-eluting stents due to public health risks posed by inadequate supply).
223

324

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

[Vol. 13

if a patent holder is able to meet customer demand this could potentially prove
costly to patent holders who are ill-equipped to handle the rise in demand. This
could make injunctive relief seem more like a curse than a blessing. Some courts
have attempted to ease these supply concerns by providing transition periods
that delay the time that the permanent injunction goes into effect.229 If courts are
unwilling to apply a rebuttable presumption of public interest in medicallyrelated patent cases, courts should allow for periods of transition in all
medically-related infringement cases to protect the public from potential supply
issues. Finally, while unrelated to the supply of the patent holder’s product,
there have been expressed concerns regarding the unused supply of the
infringing product when a permanent injunction ceases its distribution.230 This
can lead to waste that ultimately harms the general public.231
5. Costs of Transition
A fifth reason supporting a rebuttable presumption of public interest is the
exorbitant costs of transition in the event of a permanent injunction. Patients
may take on additional costs due to an increase in price for the alternative
product or additional appointments with doctors to make the transition.232
Additionally, patients may even be encouraged not to make the transition, thus
placing them at increased health risks.233 Patients are not the sole cost-bearing
entity in a transition, however. Medical professionals can also experience
exorbitant transitional costs including training of personnel to use the alternative
device, increasing prices for the alternative device, and disposal of existing
inventories of the infringing product.234
6. Other Considerations
Underlying each preceding reason is the primary concern for patient
safety. However, there are additional considerations that help support the
necessity for a rebuttable presumption of public interest. These considerations
include potential inequitable use of the patent by the patentee, potential harm
when the patentee does not commercially practice the patent, or the harm to
patient privacy and the physician-patient relationship in enforcing the
injunction.235
229
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C. Hypotheticals
The necessity for a rebuttable presumption that the public interest weighs
in favor of denying injunctive relief in cases involving medically-related patents
is best demonstrated by a set of hypothetical situations.
1. The Teenage Girl
Consider a teenage girl who has used a specific contraceptive for many
months. All of a sudden the contraceptive is taken off the market due to a
permanent injunction forcing the girl to use a new contraceptive. There are three
effects that could potentially occur from this injunction. First, the new
contraceptive could prove less effective than her previous contraceptive. This
could injure the girl both medically and financially. Second, the new
contraceptive could provide the girl with a different physiological reaction than
the previous contraceptive potentially causing significant harm to the girl’s
health. Third, the new contraceptive could be out of stock due to the increased
demand, leaving the girl with no viable alternatives. Ultimately, the girl is
placed at greater risks when a permanent injunction is granted.
2. The Senior Citizen
Next, consider a senior citizen who has suffered many years from heart
complications. For five years he has been using a coronary stent. This stent is
implanted surgically and must be replaced every year. Upon the man’s yearly
replacement, he is informed that the stent he has been using for the past five
years is no longer available due to a permanent injunction. There are four effects
that could potentially occur from this injunction. First, the man could choose not
to replace the stent, thus placing his health at risk. Second, the man could use a
new stent that proves ineffective, thus exacerbating his existing heart condition.
Third, the man’s physician could be less comfortable surgically implanting the
new stent, thus increasing the risk of the replacement surgery. Finally, the new
stent could be unavailable due to the increased demand, leaving the man with no
viable alternatives. Ultimately, the senior citizen is placed at greater risks when
a permanent injunction is granted.
3. The Sole Community Hospital
Finally, imagine a small community that has one hospital. This hospital
uses a particular type of MRI machine. One day, the hospital is informed that the
MRI machine has been subjected to a permanent injunction, and the hospital
must purchase an alternative to continue performing MRIs. There are many
effects that could potentially occur due to this injunction. First, the hospital may
not have the resources available to purchase the new machine. This would force
all patients in need of an MRI to visit alternative hospitals. This would place the
hospital at financial risk and the patients at both financial and physical risk.
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Second, the hospital may purchase the new machine but improperly train its
personnel how to use the new machine thereby leading to inaccurate test results.
Third, the hospital may purchase the new machine but be forced to make
significant budget cuts, which diminishes hospital resources overall. Ultimately,
the sole community hospital and the members of the community are placed at
greater risks when a permanent injunction is granted.

CONCLUSION
Injunctive relief has long been considered an “extraordinary” remedy. 236
However, this has been at odds with the frequency that district courts grant
injunctive relief in patent infringement cases. Because the interest of the public
is one of the factors in the traditional four-factor test, it is obvious that the public
interest is of great concern to courts. However, the large number of permanent
injunctions granted in medically-related patent infringement cases presents
many risks and potential harm to the public; therefore, courts should play a role
in helping to protect the interest in public health by applying a rebuttable
presumption that the public interest weighs in favor of denying injunctive relief
in cases that involve medically-related patents.

236

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).

